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Veterans Treatment Courts: 
Do Status-Based Problem-Solving Courts Create an 
Improper Privileged Class of Criminal Defendants? 
Allison E. Jones  
I. INTRODUCTION 
August 9, 2010, went from bad to worse for Army Staff Sergeant 
Brad Eifert, a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
1
 He was 
struggling, like so many of his colleagues, to reacclimate to civilian 
life in his suburban hometown of Okemos, Michigan.
2
 After a 
sleepless night, having heard of an attack on a friend’s base in 
Afghanistan, Eifert spent the day drinking and sinking into a deep 
depression.
3
 Eifert called his commanding officers for help.
4
 He was 
on his way to the hospital for a mental health evaluation, 
accompanied by his Army chaperone, when he snatched his keys 
away from his chaperone, tore the stripes off of his uniform, and fled 
home.
5
 After warning his wife and children to stay away from him, 
Eifert retrieved three guns and retreated to the nearby woods, intent 
on ending his life for the second time that year.
6
 Police officers called 
to the scene kept their weapons trained on Eifert, and a standoff 
 
  J.D. (2013), Washington University School of Law; M.S.W. (2013), George Warren 
Brown School of Social Work, Washington University in St. Louis; B.A. (2005), Brown 
University. 
 1. Erica Goode, Coming Together to Fight for a Troubled Veteran, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/us/18vets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
In preparing this Note for publication, the author learned that Staff Sergeant Eifert was found 
dead on September 4, 2012. Mark Bashore, In Memoriam: Brad Eifert, U.S. Army Veteran, 
WKAR (Sept. 7, 2012), http://wkar.org/post/memoriam-brad-eifert-us-army-veteran. His 
contribution to the national dialogue on the legal and policy responses to challenges facing 
military veterans is greatly appreciated. 
 2. Goode, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
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ensued.
7
 In a haze of alcohol and adrenaline, Eifert was unable to pull 
the trigger of the gun he had pointed at his own head, and instead 
aimed and fired his gun at what he perceived to be tree trunks in his 
field of compromised vision.
8
 In actuality, Eifert fired nine rounds at 
the four police officers who surrounded him.
9
 He then abandoned his 
weapons and ran towards the street, shouting ―Shoot me!‖ until the 
officers were able to subdue him.
10
 
Facing five counts of assault with intent to murder and five 
possible life sentences in the traditional criminal justice system, 
Eifert received an enormous break when his story caught the attention 
of Judge David Jordan, founder of the Veterans Treatment Court in 
East Lansing.
11
 A recent innovation, veterans treatment courts are an 
outgrowth of the drug and mental health ―specialty‖ or ―problem-
solving‖ court models, which create alternative sentencing and 
punishment structures emphasizing community-based treatment in 
lieu of incarceration for offenders whose criminal activity arises out 
of substance addiction or mental illness.
12
 Launched in response to 
the rising number of military veterans in the criminal justice system, 
veterans treatment courts are the result of a collaborative effort by 
sponsoring judges, prosecutors, public defenders, Veterans 
Administration (VA) health care providers, and often victims.
13
 
 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. Eifert’s actions are representative of a growing number of Iraq and Afghanistan 
veterans whose post-traumatic dysfunction leads to fraught encounters with law enforcement 
following instances of domestic violence, assaults, and suicide attempts, including ―suicides by 
cop.‖ Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Drug courts were first conceived and implemented in the 1980s in response to 
growing court and incarceration costs resulting from tough sentencing restrictions for drug 
crimes. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-53, ADULT DRUG COURTS: STUDIES 
SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT DOJ COULD ENHANCE FUTURE PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE REVISION EFFORTS 1 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/ 
586793.pdf [hereinafter GAO-12-53]; CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41448, 
DRUG COURTS: BACKGROUND, EFFECTIVENESS, AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONG. 3 (Oct. 12, 
2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41448.pdf. Other problem-solving courts 
have grown from the drug court model, including mental health courts and veterans treatment 
courts. Id. at 6. These problem-solving courts seek to treat the underlying causes of criminal 
activity by mandating court-supervised treatment and imposing incarceration only if those 
treatment requirements go unmet. See id. at 9–12. 
 13. Goode, supra note 1. 
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These treatment courts are designed to rehabilitate, in non-
correctional settings, veterans who commit combat stress-related 
crimes.
14
 For Staff Sergeant Eifert, the veterans treatment court 
program allowed him to remain with his family while adhering to a 
strict, court-monitored course of treatment and sobriety established 
by VA mental health professionals.
15
 It also meant he would be 
featured on the front page of the New York Times as a dual exemplar 
of the devastating potential effects of combat trauma and of the 
promise of the veterans treatment court model as a community-based 
path to rehabilitation.
16
 
Despite the potential for better long-term outcomes for Eifert and 
other veterans treatment court participants, there remain untested, and 
therefore unresolved, legal concerns regarding this new form of 
problem-solving court.
17
 For example, eligibility for traditional drug 
and mental health court participation requires a diagnosis related to 
drug addiction or mental health, and a causal connection between that 
diagnosis and the offense in question.
18
 In contrast, eligibility for 
participation in veterans treatment court programs is contingent on 
veteran or active military status.
19
 In most cases, it is assumed that 
veteran status serves as a proxy for mental health or substance use 
disorder diagnoses, given the high rates of these disorders among 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. Eifert pled guilty to a felony weapons charge to qualify for veterans court 
participation. Id. If he complied with the treatment and monitoring terms imposed by the court 
over a twelve to eighteen month period, his sentence would be reduced to a misdemeanor or 
dismissed entirely. Id. 
 16. Id. Despite the prominence of Eifert’s story, the article also highlights that his case is 
somewhat unusual among veterans treatment court cases because of the violence of his offense. 
Id. Many veterans courts, and the previously proposed federal legislation that could expand 
funding for such programs, restrict participation to non-violent offenders. Id.; see also Services, 
Education, and Rehabilitation for Veterans Act, H.R. 2026, 112th Cong. (2011). The East 
Lansing veterans treatment program was similarly limited to non-violent offenses, but Judge 
Jordan persuaded the prosecutor and law enforcement officers to waive their objections and 
allow a sentence of treatment in lieu of prison. Goode, supra note 1. 
 17. See Dahlia Lithwick, A Separate Peace, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/02/a_separate_peace.html. 
 18. See GAO-12-53, supra note 12, at 5. 
 19. Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J. 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 363 (2009). 
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veterans.
20
 However, the novelty of and lack of uniformity among 
these programs has led some concerned observers to question 
whether these courts provide a veterans-only sentencing track, 
offering preferential treatment for similarly situated criminal 
defendants based solely on their status as veterans, rather than on a 
demonstration of acute combat stress or a similarly qualifying 
disorder.
21
 
Although veterans treatment courts themselves are a recent and 
developing innovation, veteran status and its intersection with 
criminal sentencing considerations has an increasingly substantial 
legal basis to draw on. Prior to the expansion of problem-solving 
courts to reach veterans, many state-level trial court judges already 
considered military service-related disorders as potential mitigating 
factors.
22
 More recently, several states have either passed or proposed 
legislation designating veteran or active military status as a statutory 
mitigating factor,
23
 and current federal sentencing guidelines follow a 
2009 Supreme Court decision affirming the proper role of a 
defendant’s military history in the penalty phase.24 Given the weight 
of political and legal decisions supporting veteran status as a 
mitigating factor in criminal cases, veterans treatment courts might 
ultimately demonstrate the advantages of treatment as an alternative 
to incarceration. 
Part II of this Note examines the origins and current operations of 
veterans treatment courts, and outlines the policy arguments 
articulated in their favor and the legal concerns raised by critics. Part 
III discusses the treatment of veteran status in sentencing outside of 
the specialty court context, highlighting statutory and non-statutory 
state sentencing guidelines and the recent federal response to military 
service-related crime. Part IV provides an analysis of the propriety of 
 
 20. Id. at 360–63, 365–68 (discussing the prevalence of mental health and substance use 
disorders among veterans, and how eligibility is initially determined by identification of 
veterans entering the criminal justice system followed by screening for mental or substance use 
disorders). 
 21. Lithwick, supra note 17.  
 22. See Adam Caine, Comment, Fallen from Grace: Why Treatment Should be 
Considered for Convicted Combat Veterans Suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 215 (2009). 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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the veterans court model in light of the current state of the law 
outlined in Part III, and proposes a path forward for veterans courts, 
taking both legal sources of support and public criticism into 
consideration. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Development of Veterans Treatment Courts 
In January 2008, municipal Judge Robert Russell launched the 
Buffalo, New York, Veterans Treatment Court.
25
 Judge Russell 
established the court in response to the growing number of veterans 
appearing before him in the drug and mental health courts he had also 
founded and has presided over since 1995.
26
 Asserting that existing 
problem-solving courts did not adequately meet the needs of veteran-
status participants, ―a niche population with unique needs‖27 resulting 
from its military history, Judge Russell sought to create a blended 
drug and mental health court program tailored to those unique needs 
and to the military culture that veterans involved in the criminal 
justice system were more familiar with.
28
 Failure to create this court 
program, Russell argued, would violate the principles of the problem-
solving court model, in which future criminal behavior is curbed by 
directly addressing the underlying health conditions that lead to 
criminal activity.
29
 For military veterans, that underlying condition is 
 
 25. Amanda Ruggeri, New Courts Give Troubled Veterans a Second Chance, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2009/04/03/new-
courts-give-troubled-veterans-a-second-chance. 
 26. Id. There appears to be some dispute as to whether the Buffalo Veterans Treatment 
Court, widely touted as the first in the nation, was in fact predated by a specialty court targeting 
veterans launched in Anchorage, Alaska, in 2004. The Anchorage court was founded by two 
judges, themselves military veterans, who, like Judge Russell, were concerned about the 
increasing number of veterans appearing before them on charges arising out of drug and mental 
health conditions. Some reports, while acknowledging the Anchorage court’s existence, suggest 
the Anchorage court was less formally structured than the Buffalo court and therefore not 
properly designated as the first veterans treatment court. Id. But see Michael Daly Hawkins, 
Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of Military Veterans to the Criminal Justice 
System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 566 (2010) (noting the Buffalo court was established after 
the veterans court in Anchorage and has no formal structure). 
 27. Russell, supra note 19, at 363. 
 28. Id. at 365. 
 29. Id. at 363–64. 
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not only substance use disorder, post-traumatic stress, or major 
depression, for example, but often the combat or other military-
related trauma that gives rise to addiction and mental illness.
30
 
The Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court has quickly become the 
model for dozens of new veterans treatment court programs.
31
 As of 
June 30, 2012, a reported 104 veterans treatment court programs had 
been established in twenty-seven states.
32
 Legislative initiatives at the 
federal and state levels indicate that veterans courts are likely to 
expand further. Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, and 
Texas have enacted legislation permitting the establishment of county 
and municipal-level veterans treatment courts.
33
 At the federal level, 
the Services, Education, and Rehabilitation for Veterans (SERV) Act 
was introduced in Congress in 2009, 2010, and 2011, and sought to 
establish federal grants to fund veterans treatment courts.
34
  
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Ruggeri, supra note 25. 
 32. The History, JUSTICE FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2013). In October 2010, NADCP reported thirty-eight veterans courts in eighteen 
states, indicating these programs more than doubled nationwide in less than two years. See 
Tiffany Cartwright, Note, “To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle”: The Recent 
Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 305 
(2011). 
 33. Veterans Treatment Court State Legislation, JUSTICE FOR VETS, http://www 
.justiceforvets.org/state-legislation (last visited Apr. 11, 2013). 
 34. See H.R. 2026, 112th Cong. (2011). Initially introduced by Senator John Kerry, the 
SERV Act: 
[a]uthorize[d] the Attorney General to make grants to states and other entities: (1) to 
develop, implement, or enhance veteran’s treatment courts or to expand operational 
drug courts to serve veterans; and (2) for programs that involve continuing judicial 
supervision over nonviolent offenders with substance abuse or mental health problems 
who have served in the U.S. military. Requires such programs to include mandatory 
periodic testing for the use of drugs, substance abuse and mental health treatment, 
opportunities for diversion, probation, or supervised release, and programmatic, 
offender management, and aftercare services. 
Id. H.R. 2026 and identical bills proposed in 2009 and 2010 in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate died in committee. See H.R. 7149, 110th Cong. (2009); S. 3379, 
110th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2138, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 902, 111th Cong. (2010). At the time of 
writing, the SERV Act had not been reintroduced in either chamber in the 113th Congress.  
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B. The Veterans Treatment Court Model 
While there is significant variation in the program models 
currently implemented by courts across municipalities, they are 
generally based on the drug court model endorsed by the National 
Association of Drug Court Professionals, which in turn has endorsed 
the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court model for national 
replication.
35
 A typical case begins with screening for veteran status 
at arrest.
36
 If the arrestee self-identifies as a veteran, he or she is 
screened for treatment court and VA benefits eligibility.
37
 In most 
jurisdictions, only those offenders charged with non-violent crimes 
with a demonstrated need for mental health or substance use 
treatment are eligible to participate in the veterans treatment court.
38
 
Participation in veterans treatment court is voluntary, although the 
incentives to participate are substantial. Most veterans courts accept 
participants facing felony convictions and lengthy jail terms, for 
whom the option of community-based rehabilitative treatment in lieu 
of incarceration is clearly preferable.
39
 Mental health professionals 
assess participating veterans, usually through Veterans Health 
Administration (VHA) services, and determine treatment needs.
40
 
 
 35. The design of the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court was based closely on the 
National Association of Drug Court Professional’s (NADCP) list of ―10 Key Components of a 
Drug Court,‖ and the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s ―Ten Essential Elements of a Mental 
Health Court.‖ Russell, supra note 19, at 364–65. The resulting hybrid veterans treatment court 
model identifies the following ten key elements: 1) integrate alcohol, drug treatment, and 
mental health services with justice system case processing; 2) a nonadversarial approach; 
3) early eligibility screening and placement; 4) access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, mental 
health, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services; 5) frequent alcohol and other 
drug testing; 6) a coordinated strategy governing participant compliance; 7) ongoing judicial 
interaction with each veteran; 8) monitoring and evaluation of program effectiveness; 
9) continuing interdisciplinary education; and 10) forging partnerships among relevant agencies 
and community organizations. See BUFFALO VETERAN’S COURT, MENTORING & VETERANS 
HOSPITAL PROGRAM POL’Y & PROCEDURE MANUAL, available at http://www.justiceforvets 
.org/sites/default/files/files/Buffalo%20policy%20and%20procedure%20manual.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2013). 
 36. See TINA CRENSHAW, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, 
VETERANS WITH PTSD IN THE JUSTICE SYS. (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.ptsd.va.gov/ 
professional/pages/veterans-PTSD-justice-system.asp [hereinafter CRENSHAW]. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
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Participants remain in the community, with progress toward 
treatment goals monitored by a case management team, including 
probation officers, VHA providers, and the veterans court judges.
41
 
Failure to comply with the requirements of the program, by failing a 
regular drug screen or missing a court appearance, results in the 
imposition of sanctions.
42
 Typical sanctions include community 
service, fines, jail time, or re-arrest, followed by a transfer back to the 
traditional criminal justice system.
43
 While broad-based, longitudinal 
evaluation data on the effectiveness of veterans treatment courts is 
not yet available, the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court has famously 
maintained a zero percent recidivism rate since its inception.
44
 Other 
programs have demonstrated less dramatic results but still indicate 
lower recidivism rates among program graduates than for offenders 
processed through the traditional criminal justice system.
45
 
C. Policy Rationale for Veterans Courts 
The policy arguments in favor of separate treatment courts for 
military veterans can be distilled into three central points. First, 
proponents argue that the service and sacrifice performed by these 
veterans makes them uniquely deserving of a court that recognizes 
that sacrifice.
46
 Second, heightened recognition of the substance use 
and mental health effects of combat experience, which can in some 
cases lead to criminal activity, has made rehabilitation in lieu of 
incarceration a more viable political option.
47
 Finally, practitioner 
consensus finds that veterans are better engaged by a specialty court 
 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Neale Gulley, Nation‟s First Veterans Court Counts Its Successes, REUTERS, Jan. 
9, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/09/us-court-veterans-idUSTRE 
7082U020110109. 
 45. See Jack W. Smith, Comment, The Anchorage, Alaska Veterans Court and 
Recidivism: July 6, 2004–December 31, 2010, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 107–08 (2012). This 
small-scale (n=38) study found a recidivism rate of 45 percent for graduates of the Anchorage 
veterans treatment court, compared with a 50.4 percent recidivism rate for Alaska offenders 
overall. Id. 
 46. Russell, supra note 19, at 364. 
 47. Id. at 363–64.  
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sensitive to military culture and connected with the VA medical 
services for which many participants are already eligible.
48
 
The trauma-based ―unique needs‖ that served as both inspiration 
and justification for the creation of new veteran status-based 
treatment courts are generally described in the context of the most 
recent United States military conflicts, Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan and Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn in 
Iraq.
49
 Indeed, the in-theater military experience of these operations 
stands in some contrast to those experienced by veterans of earlier 
conflicts. The length and frequency of deployments to Iraq and 
Afghanistan were unprecedented in American military history,
50
 and 
reliance on an all-volunteer fighting force meant breaks between 
deployments were truncated.
51
 Although post-traumatic stress and 
related chronic anxiety disorders have long been associated with 
combat experience,
52
 the changing nature of warfare and twenty-first 
century medical and technological advances are likely to have 
increased the survival rate for combat troops experiencing trauma.
53
 
By extension, the societal challenges faced by these service members 
when they transition back into civilian life have likewise expanded.
54
 
In 2004, approximately 10 percent of federal and state prisoners 
reported prior service in the U.S. Armed Forces, with 4 percent 
having served in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
55
 Symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can contribute to the likelihood 
that persons with the disorder will engage in illegal conduct. Three 
 
 48. Id.  
 49. See Crenshaw, supra note 36. 
 50. TERRI TANIELIAN ET AL., RAND CTR. FOR MILITARY HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, 
INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING 
PSYCHOLOGICAL & COGNITIVE INJURIES 1 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG720.1.pdf [hereinafter TANIELIAN]. 
 51. VANESSA WILLIAMSON & ERIN MULHALL, IRAQ & AFG. VETERANS OF AM., 
INVISIBLE WOUNDS: PSYCHOLOGICAL & NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES CONFRONT A NEW 
GENERATION OF VETERANS 6 (Jan. 2009), available at http://iava.org/files/IAVA_invisible_ 
wounds_0.pdf. 
 52. As early as 1919, scientists identified and researched the symptoms of ―shell shock,‖ 
or ―war neuroses,‖ on French veterans of World War I. Id. at 1. 
 53. TANIELIAN, supra note 50, at 1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. MARGARET E. NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: VETERANS IN STATE & FED. PRISON 
2004 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vsfp04.pdf.  
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key domains of functioning are negatively impacted by PTSD 
symptoms: cognition, physiological arousal, and emotions.
56
 
Cognitive changes include flashbacks to traumatic events, an 
inclination to improperly perceive events as threatening, and strong 
present-day orientation resulting in a failure to plan for the future.
57
 
Heightened psychophysiological arousal may manifest in anger and 
irritability, hypervigilance, and a heightened startle response.
58
 
Emotional effects of PTSD are characterized by high levels of 
psychological distress, including chronic negative emotions, as well 
as emotional numbing resulting in impaired empathic responses.
59
 
The cumulative effect of these symptoms can prompt individuals 
with PTSD to act aggressively or impulsively out of self-
preservation, without full appreciation of the harmful consequences 
to oneself and others.
60
 PTSD might be, therefore, a root cause of 
some violent, criminal conduct. 
The return of veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan has coincided 
with high-profile cases of violent criminal activity by former 
combatants experiencing post-traumatic stress and related disorders.
61
 
The general public response to trauma-related crimes following the 
 
 56. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, DSM CRITERIA FOR 
PTSD (July 7, 2007), http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/dsm-iv-tr-ptsd.asp. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study found male veterans diagnosed 
with PTSD committed more violent acts against others than veterans without a PTSD diagnosis: 
13.3 violent acts in one year, compared to 3.54 acts for those without PTSD. See Cathy Ho 
Hartsfield, Note, Deportation of Veterans: The Silent Battle for Naturalization, 64 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 835, 851 n.143 (2012). Other studies have found the rate of PTSD diagnosis among prison 
inmates to be higher than in the general population, although this data supports correlation only 
and not a causal link. See, e.g., Andrea Friel et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal 
Responsibility, 19 J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 64, 70–71 (2008).  
 61. Most notably, fourteen Iraq veterans stationed at or living near Fort Carson, the 
nation’s third-largest Army base, located near Colorado Springs, were charged or convicted of 
eleven murders between 2005 and 2009. L. Christopher Smith, The Fort Carson Murder Spree, 
ROLLING STONE, Nov. 12, 2009, at 52, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ 
the-fort-carson-murder-spree-20091112. Numerous additional news accounts of Iraq and 
Afghanistan veterans invading neighbors’ homes or attempting suicide by cop have brought the 
issue widespread national attention. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 1; Lizette Alvarez & Deborah 
Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/15/us/15vets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Lizette Alvarez 
& Deborah Sontag, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/us/13vets.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Vietnam War tended to favor incarceration and institutionalization of 
those unable to lawfully transition back into civilian society.
62
 In 
contrast, increased recognition of the effects of combat trauma by 
military branches, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the 
general public led to increased support for incorporating treatment 
modalities into the handling of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans’ 
criminal cases.
63
 Policy responses to combat trauma-related crime 
extend beyond the veterans treatment court intervention model 
adopted by the states and municipalities. The Department of Veterans 
Affairs launched the Veterans Justice Outreach Initiative in 2009 to 
serve as a liaison between justice-involved veterans and law 
enforcement agencies and courts, to promote the provision of mental 
health treatment services among veteran offenders.
64
 
In addition to the cultural and health benefits resulting from 
veterans treatment courts, specialty courts in general are lauded for 
their cost-effectiveness relative to incarceration.
65
 Practitioners 
advocating for a cheaper and more efficient penalty system in light of 
current economic constraints estimate that problem-solving courts 
provide cost savings of $4,000 to $12,000 per offender.
66
  
D. Controversy  
While lawmakers and media outlets generally praise veterans 
treatment courts as smart policy,
67
 watchdog groups and concerned 
 
 62. Lithwick, supra note 17. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See About the Initiative, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/HOMELESS 
/about_the_initiative.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2013). 
 65. Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, The Great Recession as a Catalyst for More 
Effective Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 146, 147 (2010). 
 66. Id. Shepard asserts the savings resulting from Indiana’s establishment of drug courts 
reached $7 million in 2010, when including savings on incarceration, reduced recidivism, and 
reduced costs to victims. Id. at 148. At the time of writing, no nationwide cost comparison 
statistics were available for veterans treatment courts specifically. At the state level, however, 
some jurisdictions that had undertaken a cost-benefit analysis of mandating the implementation 
of veterans treatment courts concluded the added burden on judges, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys would outweigh program benefits. See TENN. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 
VETERANS TREATMENT COURT LEGISLATIVE REPORT, PUB. CHAPTER 943, 7 (2012), available 
at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/560248-report-on-veterans-treatment-courts.html.  
 67. See Goode, supra note 1. Despite the rapid growth of veterans courts nationwide, 
reluctance to participate on the part of prosecutors persists. The Platte County, Missouri, 
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jurists have raised legal objections questioning the constitutionality of 
creating a special legal class of criminal defendants based solely on 
veteran status.
68
 Specifically, state-level American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) organizations have raised concerns over the 
establishment of new veterans courts in their states. Lee Rowland of 
the ACLU of Nevada opposed the establishment of a state veterans 
treatment court program on the grounds that it granted ―an automatic 
free pass based on military status to certain criminal defense rights 
that others don’t have.‖69 Similarly, Mark Silverstein of the Colorado 
ACLU objected to a local veterans court by arguing that veteran 
status is both over- and under-inclusive, available to Vietnam and 
World War II veterans who have widely varying combat experiences, 
while nonveterans diagnosed with PTSD are excluded. Silverstein 
questioned why ―the criminal justice system take[s] into account 
PTSD when it arises from military service but disregard[s] it when it 
stems from different but nevertheless horrific life experiences?‖70  
While the ACLU did not elect to test these courts through 
litigation, preferring instead to endorse courts that require a tighter 
nexus between combat stress and criminal charges,
71
 the issue of 
unfair preferential treatment as a violation of equal justice principles 
remains. Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Barry Schaller, in 
 
prosecutor refused to consider treatment alternatives for a local veteran involved in an armed 
standoff with police, saying: ―P.T.S.D. is not a get out of jail free card.‖ Id. 
 68. Lithwick, supra note 17. It bears noting that, apart from the unique characteristics of 
veterans treatment courts, the general specialty court model has generated a significant amount 
of controversy, particularly from criminal defense practitioners concerned about the ethics and 
procedural anomalies of representation in a non-adversarial, treatment-focused setting. See, e.g., 
Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and 
Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57, 64–65 (2009). 
Additionally, commentators have questioned the appropriateness of the treatment court model 
in cases of intimate partner violence and sexual assault. For an argument that veterans treatment 
courts specifically should not hear intimate partner violence cases, see Pamela Kravetz, Note, 
Way Off Base: An Argument Against Intimate Partner Violence Cases in Veterans Treatment 
Courts, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 162 (2012).  
 69. Lithwick, supra note 17. 
 70. Id. 
 71. The ACLU of Illinois distinguished the Cook County veterans treatment court from 
those in Nevada, asserting Nevada ―automatically transferred‖ offenders with veteran status 
into the program and provided special treatment in the form of reduced sentences. Matthew 
Walberg, Cook County Veterans Court Offers Helping Hand, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 2009, 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-15/news/0907140761_1_special-court-
newveterans-helping. 
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supporting diversion programs over problem-solving courts for 
veterans, expressed unease regarding the constitutionality of 
veterans-only courts: ―Courts have to be open to everyone and 
provide equal opportunity, equal access. . . . The courts can provide 
special opportunities for veterans without jeopardizing the justice 
mandate.‖72 
III. VETERAN STATUS OUTSIDE THE PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT 
MODEL 
These constitutional objections highlight the key distinction 
between veterans courts and the drug court model they have grown 
out of: veterans courts appear to create a special, arguably 
preferential, class within the criminal justice system based on veteran 
status rather than on a condition of mental illness or addiction out of 
which criminal activity arises.
73
 Formalization of veteran status as a 
special class of criminal defendants predates veterans treatment 
courts, however, as does a court’s consideration of combat 
experience as a mitigating factor in criminal sentencing. 
A. State Statutes 
1. North Carolina 
North Carolina appears to be one of the first states to statutorily 
enshrine veteran status as a mitigating factor in felony sentencing. 
Section 15A-1340.16(e)(14) of the North Carolina General Statute 
requires criminal courts to consider whether ―[t]he defendant has 
been honorably discharged from the Armed Forces of the United 
States.‖74 Court enforcement of this provision can be seen as early as 
1983.
75
 In State v. Blackwelder, the court remanded, finding, inter 
alia, ―if, at resentencing, evidence establishes that defendant was 
 
 72. Elliot Blair Smith, War Heroes Gone Bad Divided by Courts Favoring Prison or 
Healing, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-02/ 
war-heroes-gone-bad-divided-by-courts-favoring-prison-or-healing#p1. 
 73. Lithwick, supra note 17. 
 74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-1340.16(e)(14) (2012). 
 75. See State v. Blackwelder, 306 S.E.2d. 783 (N.C. 1983). 
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honorably discharged from armed services, that factor would be 
required to be found in mitigation.‖76 While evidencing an early 
recognition of the relevance of prior military service to criminal 
sentencing, North Carolina’s statute is narrowly drawn—limiting the 
benefit only to those honorably discharged—and has not since been 
revised to reflect evolving understandings of combat trauma and its 
effects on behavior.  
2. California 
In 1984, California established statutory sentencing guidelines for 
veterans.
77
 Section 1170.9 of the California Penal Code, in contrast to 
the North Carolina statute, explicitly contemplated combat trauma 
and directed: 
In the case of any person convicted of a felony who would 
otherwise be sentenced to state prison the court shall consider 
whether the defendant was a member of the military forces of 
the United States who served in combat in Vietnam and who 
suffers from substance abuse or psychological problems 
resulting from that service.
78
 
The statute provided the option of treatment in federal facilities in 
lieu of incarceration for felony defendants who met the requirement 
of Vietnam combat experience and could establish a causal link 
between their mental illness or substance use and combat stress.
79
 
While groundbreaking in its early recognition of PTSD as a 
contributing factor in criminal activity, coming only four years after 
the inclusion of PTSD in the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III),
80
 
 
 76. Blackwelder, 306 S.E.2d. at 783. 
 77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9 (1984). 
 78. Id. Section 1170.9 followed a 1982 California statute calling for greater cooperation 
between the Department of Corrections and federal, state, and local veterans service providers. 
See 1982 Cal. Stat. 964. 
 79. § 1170.9. 
 80. See Kathleen Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing Trauma Throughout Capital 
Mitigation Investigations and Presentations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 928 n.18 (2008) (citing 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236–
38 (3d ed. 1980)). 
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section 1170.9 had a relatively minimal impact on veteran sentencing 
because courts found the participation of federal facilities to be 
impractical.
81
  
The California Legislature proposed and enacted a number of 
revisions to section 1170.9 in 2006, to expand applicability of special 
sentencing considerations to veterans of the contemporary conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.
82
 Additionally, the revised statute made a pre-
sentencing hearing mandatory, rather than discretionary, where the 
defendant ―alleges that he or she committed the offense as a result of 
post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or psychological 
problems stemming from service in combat in the United States 
military.‖83 While expanding the reach of alternative sentencing 
options for veterans, however, the 2006 revisions highlighted two key 
limitations. First, while the statute now authorized sentencing 
treatment in lieu of incarceration, imposing such a sentence remained 
within the discretion of the sentencing body.
84
 Second, section 1(f) of 
the 2006 act reads: ―It is not the intent of the Legislature to expand 
probation eligibility for veterans who commit crimes pursuant to 
these provisions.‖85 The latter provision ensured that treatment 
sentences would be available primarily to non-violent, non-repeat 
offenders.
86
 
The California legislature enacted additional revisions to 
section 1170.9 in 2010, which further expanded the reach of the 
statute while maintaining the probation-eligibility limitation.
87
 The 
legislature added military sexual trauma and traumatic brain injury to 
the list of diagnoses contemplated under the alternative sentencing 
provisions.
88
 Significantly, the 2010 version also eliminated the 
 
 81. Caine, supra note 22, at 226. 
 82. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 788, 2586 (West).  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See People v. Ferguson, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182, 200 (Ct. App. 2011) (interpreting the 
probation requirement broadly to bar veterans ―technically eligible‖ for probation where 
probation is inappropriate given the violent nature or seriousness of the crime). 
 87. 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 347, 674 (West). 
 88. Id. 
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requirement that the precipitating disorder result from combat 
experience, making it contingent on military service only.
89
  
3. Minnesota 
Unlike the California statute, which expanded longstanding 
special provisions for veteran defendants in sentencing, the 
Minnesota statute incorporated military service provisions into a 
general presentencing report.
90
 Minnesota Statutes section 609.115 
requires the preparation of a post-conviction, presentencing report, to 
include the offender’s ―individual characteristics, circumstances, 
needs, potentialities, criminal record and social history, the 
circumstances of the offense and the harm caused by it to others and 
to the community.‖91 A 2008 amendment to the statute added veteran 
status to the list of characteristics that the presentence investigation 
must inquire into:
92
 ―[w]hen a defendant appears in court and is 
convicted of a crime, the court shall inquire whether the defendant is 
currently serving in or is a veteran of the armed forces of the United 
States.‖93 If the court finds the defendant to be in active military 
service or a military veteran with a diagnosed mental illness, the 
court is authorized, but not required, to consult with Veterans 
Administration health providers or other service providers to 
determine a course of treatment.
94
   
 
 89. Id. The elimination of the combat requirement can be seen, in light of the 
contemporaneous revisions, as expanding the provision’s reach to include female service 
members, who rarely serve on the front lines but experience military sexual trauma and its 
resulting mental health and substance use disorders at high rates. See Erin Mulhall, Women 
Warriors: Supporting She „Who has Borne the Battle,’ IRAQ & AFG. VETERANS AM.  6  (Oct. 
2009), available at http://media.iava.org/IAVA_WomensReport_2009.pdf. However, the 
California courts have yet to encounter a case requiring interpretation of the revised statutory 
language and its applicability to non-combat veterans generally. 
 90. Caine, supra note 22, at 231. 
 91. MINN. STAT. § 609.115 (2012).  
 92. Id. Other specific characteristics enumerated in the statute include current and prior 
chemical dependency history and a compulsive gambling assessment for theft-related 
convictions. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
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4. Notable State Bills 
In recent years, a number of states have proposed similar 
legislation to formalize prior military service as a consideration in 
criminal sentencing,
95
 reflecting a growing consensus on the 
relevance of veteran and active military status in the evaluation of 
criminal responsibility. Ohio’s proposed legislation amends the state 
sentencing statute as follows: 
The sentencing court shall consider the offender’s military 
service record and whether the offender has an emotional, 
mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s 
service in the armed forces of the United States and that was a 
contributing factor in the offender’s commission of the offense 
or offenses.
96
 
The Ohio bill is significant in its combination of a holistic approach 
to the potential effects of military service on behavior (i.e., combat 
service is not a requirement here) and in its mandatory language.  
B. Federal Courts‟ Consideration of Veteran Status 
Outside of the veterans specialty court model and those states that 
have formalized veteran status within their criminal sentencing 
regimes, courts have considered military experience, and its 
increasingly well-known psychological consequences, in sentencing 
decisions on a case-by-case basis. While military service has 
previously been found inapplicable as a mitigating factor,
97
 a recent 
United States Supreme Court decision and its reflection in federal 
sentencing guidelines suggests that federal courts have joined the 
states in the growing consensus that veteran status should be 
considered in at least some criminal sentencing contexts.  
 
 95. See, e.g., Assem. No. 2663, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (amending the statute to include 
the following language: ―The defendant suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, substance 
abuse, psychiatric, or psychological problems resulting from service as a member of the United 
States Armed Forces in a combat theater of operations during a time of war or emergency.‖). 
 96. S.B. No. 330, 129th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012). 
 97. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lett, 483 F.3d 782 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 811 
(2008) (reversing the trial court’s downward adjustment of an active duty soldier’s drug-related 
sentence, even where the Army advocated for sentence mitigation). 
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1. Porter v. McCollum 
The United States Supreme Court, in a 2009 per curiam decision, 
elevated the importance of combat experience to sentencing 
determinations in death penalty cases, requiring defense counsel to 
present such evidence where it exists.
98
 Petitioner George Porter was 
a Korean War veteran who had served in two of the bloodiest battles 
of the conflict.
99
 Throughout his tour of duty in Korea, his return to 
the United States, and after his discharge from the Army, Porter 
demonstrated signs of mental agitation and psychological distress by 
repeatedly going absent without leave, reporting frequent and severe 
nightmares, and developing alcohol dependency.
100
 In 1986, Porter 
was convicted of two counts of first degree murder for shooting and 
killing his former girlfriend and her boyfriend.
101
 He was sentenced 
to death.
102
 At issue before the Court was defense counsel’s failure to 
present evidence of Porter’s combat experience and subsequent 
trauma during the penalty phase of the murder trial.
103
 
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Court held the failure of 
Porter’s attorney to present this mitigating evidence constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of Porter’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.
104
 While the Court highlighted several sources of 
trauma specific to Porter’s life experience as reasonable mitigating 
factors,
105
 the opinion’s general recognition of the relevance of 
 
 98. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, (2009) (per curiam).  
 99. Id. at 30. During Porter’s appeal, his commanding officer testified as to the extreme 
conditions Porter and his company endured during the battles at Kunu-ri and Chip’yong-ni. Id. 
at 34–35. Both battles involved several days of engagement with the enemy without rest. Id. 
The casualty rate at Chip’yong-ni was over 50 percent. Id. Porter himself was wounded in both 
battles, sustaining a gunshot wound at Kunu-ri and subsequently receiving two Purple Hearts. 
Id.  
 100. Id. at 35–36. Porter’s family testified on appeal that they had resorted to hiding the 
knives in the family home to prevent him from climbing his bedroom walls with them during 
his nighttime terrors. Id. 
 101. Id. at 35–36. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. Porter’s attorney presented the following limited mitigating evidence: a statement 
from Porter’s ex-wife that his relationship with his son was a good one, that Porter ―ha[d] other 
handicaps that weren’t apparent during the trial,‖ and that Porter was not ―mentally healthy.‖ Id. 
 104. Id. The Court denied Porter’s request that his conviction be overturned. Id. 
 105. Id. at 33–34. In addition to Porter’s combat trauma, the Court asserted that evidence of 
severe physical abuse by Porter’s father during his childhood should have been presented as a 
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military service and PTSD to the commission of criminal acts 
suggests application beyond the Porter case facts. Specifically, the 
Court stated: 
Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to 
veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those 
who fought on the front lines as Porter did. Moreover, the 
relevance of Porter’s extensive combat experience is not only 
that he served honorably under extreme hardship and gruesome 
conditions, but also that the jury might find mitigating the 
intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took 
on Porter.
106
 
Linking Porter’s circumstances with those of veterans of the 
contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Court noted that 
PTSD is ―not uncommon among veterans returning from combat,‖107 
as evidenced by VA Secretary Eric Shinseki’s testimony that 23 
percent of recent veterans had a preliminary diagnosis of PTSD.
108
 
2. Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
In 2010, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines incorporated the 
Porter holding with the following amendment: ―Military service may 
be relevant in determining whether a departure [from sentencing 
 
possible mitigating factor, finding it ―unreasonable to discount to irrelevance the evidence of 
Porter’s abusive childhood, especially when that kind of history may have particular salience 
for a jury evaluating Porter’s behavior in his relationship with [the victim].‖ Id. at 43. 
Additionally, the Court found relevant the medical testimony offered on appeal that Porter had 
suffered brain damage that could result in ―impulsive, violent behavior.‖ Id. at 36. 
 The combination of mitigating factors in Porter’s case (i.e. child abuse, brain injury, and 
combat trauma) has perhaps contributed to the inconsistency of Porter’s application in 
subsequent cases. Compare Payton v. Cullen, 658 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding insufficient 
mitigating evidence to reverse a death sentence where defendant had witnessed and experienced 
sexual and verbal abuse during childhood, but demonstrated no evidence of brain injury and had 
served only twenty-two days in Vietnam), with James v. Schriro, 659 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(relying on Porter to find ineffective assistance of counsel where evidence of non-veteran 
defendant’s childhood abuse, drug use, and suicide attempts was not offered during the penalty 
phase). 
 106. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44 (internal citation omitted). 
 107. Id. at 35 n.4. 
 108. Id. (citing Hearing on Fiscal Year 2010 Budget for Veterans’ Programs before the 
Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (2009)). 
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guidelines] is warranted, if the military service, individually or in 
combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an 
unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases 
covered by the guidelines.‖109 This amendment marked a significant 
departure from the way prior Guidelines addressed military service: 
―Military, civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related 
contributions, and similar prior good works are not ordinarily 
relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.‖110 The 
Commission specifically cited Porter in its notes to the 2010 
amendments, while asserting that military service was recognized as 
a ―traditional mitigating factor‖ in sentencing.111 Notably, the revised 
Guidelines do not specify combat experience but contemplate 
military service generally.
112
 
3. Non-statutory State Sentencing Practices 
Although the instant analysis does not undertake a comprehensive 
state-level survey of the role of veteran status as a non-statutory 
mitigating factor in sentencing, it is appropriate to note that a 
criminal defendant’s military history is generally recognized as a 
relevant factor in penalty determinations.
113
 In addition to state court 
judges’ broad discretion in sentencing and consideration of mitigating 
and aggravating factors in adjusting a sentence, twenty-one states 
empanel advisory committees on sentencing to produce and distribute 
to judges a set of guidelines analogous in scope and authority to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines referenced above.
114
 Like the Federal 
Sentencing Commission, state commissions have retreated from high 
rates of incarceration in the name of sentencing consistency, and 
 
 109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (1991) (amended 2010). 
 110. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (1991) (amended 2004). 
 111. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C amend. 739 (2010). As with Porter, 
the impact of including military service as a permissible reason for departure from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines is unclear, given the 2005 shift in the Guidelines’ status from mandatory 
to advisory. See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 112. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (1991) (amended 2010).  
 113. See, e.g., State v. Fontenot, 532 So. 2d 412, 414 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a 
conviction, but finding a trial court’s failure to allow evidence of veteran status as a mitigating 
factor in error). 
 114. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 4 (July 2008). 
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trend towards flexibility and judicial discretion as the new sentencing 
paradigm.
115
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Do Veterans Treatment Courts Conform with the Current 
Criminal Sentencing Landscape? 
Veterans treatment courts and their eligibility criteria do not 
constitute a departure from the general recognition by state 
legislatures, courts, and sentencing commissions that former military 
service is an appropriate line of inquiry in the penalty phase of 
criminal prosecutions. In the absence of a direct legal challenge to the 
veterans treatment court process, the trends in this area of law and in 
each of the examined fora are most relevant to an analysis of the legal 
basis for veterans courts. The national trend is toward mandatory 
inquiry into and consideration of prior military experience, and does 
not limit consideration solely to combat experience. The statutory 
mitigation created by the recent amendments to California’s 
section 1170.9, while jurisdictionally limited, illustrates broader 
policy developments regarding the treatment of veteran offenders.
116
 
The original discretionary provision targeting Vietnam combat 
veterans has become, by amendment, a mandatory hearing trigger for 
all defendants with a military service record of any kind who claim a 
causal link between their service and their crime.
117
 The Minnesota 
statute, as amended to include military veterans, similarly requires 
courts to inquire into veteran status and possible treatment needs 
prior to sentencing, and to consider the treatment options and 
recommendations of the Veterans Administration as part of the 
sentencing process.
118
 The recent legislation proposed in Ohio 
similarly requires consideration of an expansive range of 
 
 115. See Caine, supra note 22, at 236; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 224. 
 116. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 788, 2586 (West); 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 347, 674 
(West). 
 117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9 (1984). See 1982 Cal. Stat. 964, for the original, more 
limited statutory provision for Vietnam-era combat veterans. 
 118. MINN. STAT. § 609.115 (2012). 
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psychological and behavioral effects of military service.
119
 Veterans 
treatment courts, allowing for some variation in procedure between 
different individual programs, generally conform with these 
principles: pre- and post-conviction referrals are made on the broad 
basis of a military service record, and enrollment in a program 
depends on treatment for a precipitating condition.
120
 
Equally instructive from a chronological perspective are the recent 
federal court endorsements of veteran status as a sentencing 
consideration, via the 2009 Porter decision and the 2010 Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines amendments.
121
 That these two significant 
developments—the former mandating the presentation of military 
experience evidence in capital cases, and the latter constituting a 
direct reversal of prior federal policy to ignore military service in 
sentencing—followed the rapid growth of veterans courts between 
2008 and 2010 can be seen as a tacit endorsement of veterans courts’ 
eligibility standards.
122
 One might read the case facts in Porter as 
limiting the reach of that decision to instances of extreme and 
verifiable combat trauma, thus distinguishing the holding from a 
sentencing framework based on status rather than trauma. The dicta, 
however, explicitly endorses what the Court identifies as a long and 
appropriate history of criminal leniency for veterans in recognition of 
their service and sacrifice.
123
  
The 2010 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which apply to military 
service status generally, may be understood as a direct outgrowth of 
both a broad interpretation of Porter and the veterans treatment court 
movement, since the Federal Sentencing Commission could hardly 
have been ignorant of these programs at the time it drafted the 
 
 119. S.B. No. 330, 129th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012). 
 120. See CRENSHAW, supra note 36. 
 121. Porter, 558 U.S. at 30; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (1991) 
(amended 2010). 
 122. Porter, 558 U.S. at 30; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (1991) 
(amended 2010); Russell, supra note 19, at 363. 
 123. Porter, 558 U.S. at 43–44. The Court does not discount the relevance of combat 
experience in assessing the appropriateness of extending leniency, arguing for courts’ special 
recognition of ―those who fought on the front lines.‖ Id. While demonstrable combat trauma 
clearly elevates a leniency claim in the Court’s analysis, the Court’s language does not make 
leniency exclusively available to combat veterans, but appears to contemplate military service 
generally as a reason for leniency. Id. Porter’s procedural posture, however, might limit its 
application to capital cases only. 
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Guidelines.
124
 Indeed, even more than Porter, section 5H1.11 reflects 
the national trend towards broadly defined, unqualified consideration 
of a defendant’s military history in sentencing.125 Within this 
expansive and expanding framework, veterans treatment courts 
appear to be on increasingly solid legal ground.
126
  
B. Are Veterans Courts Good Public Policy? 
The favorable public policy considerations arising out of veterans 
treatment courts include: the potential for more cost-effective 
rehabilitation, an increased military cultural competency, reduced 
recidivism, and political viability.
127
 These benefits compete against 
concerns about sentencing inconsistency and the lack of access to 
alternative sentencing paradigms by those experiencing the effects of 
non-military-related trauma.
128
 The balancing of these public policy 
considerations strongly favors veterans treatment courts. First, as 
noted above, both federal and state sentencing commissions have 
recently promulgated guidelines that tolerate greater inconsistency in 
exchange for greater flexibility in tailoring penalties to individual 
defendants.
129
 Additionally, some commentators suggest veterans 
courts may pave the way for increased access to treatment-based 
sentencing alternatives for a broader group of defendants, including 
 
 124. For a sample of prominent news articles published between 2009 and 2010 addressing 
the veterans treatment court model, see supra notes 17 and 25.  
 125. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (1991) (amended 2010). 
 126. In answer to the ACLU concerns about the lack of a causal nexus requirement 
between the offense and the offender’s military history, the veterans treatment court model 
might, in fact, hew closer to that causal nexus than do the general sentencing guidelines 
proffered by the federal courts system. The fact that participation requires treatment also 
implies the existence of a treatable condition. The Sentencing Guidelines, in contrast, allow for 
military service in isolation to be a factor in criminal sentencing. 
 Note that the healthy veteran-felon receiving a more lenient sentence on the basis of his or 
her military service alone is likely to be no more than a hypothetical scenario. The practical 
relevance of military history is its effect on the offender’s psychological or physical health. 
However, detrimental effects need not stem from combat experience, but may result from other 
abuse or trauma experienced during the course of military service, as the California mitigation 
statute recognized with its addition of military sexual trauma to the statutory provision. 2010 
Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 347, 674 (West). 
 127. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 128. See supra Part II.D.  
 129. See supra Part III.B.2–3. 
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civilians.
130
 While veteran-friendly programs are politically popular, 
demonstrated successes in community-based rehabilitation for 
veteran offenders with PTSD might justify expanding such treatment 
offerings to non-veteran residents in areas of concentrated urban 
poverty and crime, for example, who also experience PTSD in high 
rates.
131
 
C. How Should Veterans Treatment Court Programs Proceed in 
Consideration of Criticisms? 
Finding a solid legal foundation for veteran status as an eligibility 
criterion in problem-solving courts need not be the end of the inquiry. 
Given the concerns publicly raised by the ACLU and others, veterans 
treatment court programs nationwide might choose to address these 
criticisms by adopting a collective and uniform legal position based 
on the federal and state authorities outlined above.
132
 However, a 
declaration of the legal relevance of veteran status in criminal 
sentencing need not be exclusive of a simultaneous affirmation of the 
fundamental purpose of the traditional problem-solving court 
model—to connect offenders experiencing drug addiction and mental 
illness with treatment in order to reduce recidivism.
133
 Veterans 
treatment court judges and other supporters, by virtue of the strong 
legal and political backing for this model, are uniquely positioned to 
advocate for further expansion of these programs to reach 
traumatized populations beyond the military veteran community. 
Where mental health and substance use treatment providers are 
accessible, as they are within the VA health system, treatment and 
case management in lieu of incarceration can dramatically reduce 
 
 130. Lithwick argues: ―We have known for years that treatment works better than 
incarceration when it comes to criminal defendants with drug and mental-health problems. . . . 
You don’t have to oppose veterans’ court to want that type of justice for all.‖ Lithwick, supra 
note 17.  
 131. See Naomi Breslau et al., Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in an 
Urban Population of Young Adults, 48(3) ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 216, 220–21 (1991). 
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bypass ACLU scrutiny. See, e.g., SEATTLE MUN. COURT, VETERANS TREATMENT COURT., 
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alone is insufficient to support entry into VTC‖).  
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recidivism while simultaneously lowering the costs of rehabilitation 
for society.
134
 The success of the veterans court model provides a 
strong argument for a new intervention paradigm whereby the 
criminal justice system invests in greater access to health services 
instead of perpetuating existing problems of mass incarceration—a 
shift in keeping with the increased willingness of courts and 
legislatures to consider and address common disorders underlying 
criminal activity.  
V. CONCLUSION 
At the heart of the debate over veteran status as a mitigating 
factor, and the aligning state and federal responses to that 
controversy, lies an unsettled conception of fairness and equal 
treatment. Critics identify a real and concerning disparity in access to 
problem-solving courts created by programs designated for veterans 
only. Apart from equal access concerns, the high court in Porter, the 
Federal Sentencing Commission, and a growing number of state 
legislatures have found that fairness also dictates that the sacrifices 
inherent in military service deserve special consideration in the 
criminal sentencing context. As suggested above, however, these 
conceptions of fairness are not mutually exclusive. Justice and 
society are better served by veterans courts that extend appropriate 
treatment options to offenders in need of that treatment. When 
veterans treatment courts become an evidence-based and politically-
viable vehicle for extending treatment to a broader subset of 
offenders in the coming years, it is hoped the benefits of treatment in 
lieu of incarceration will become systemic. 
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